Timeline of Events
(continued)
March 4, 2004
We received an Assessment Disclosure Notice from Ms. Ray informing us that our residential assessment had been raised to $65,500 [Exhibit 13]. The cover letter [Exhibit 14] accompanying the Assessment Disclosure Notice stated that our raised preliminary assessment was based on an estimate of the fair market value of our residential property, and that this "market value is derived from recent selling prices for similar properties in the local area."
March 8, 2004
Based on past experience, we felt that representations made by the Assessor during "informal discussions" were untrustworthy and therefore any communications with the Assessor henceforth should be conducted on a formal written basis. Accordingly, under the auspices of a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request, we requested from Ms. Ray "a complete identification of the ‘similar properties’ to which you refer and upon which you are basing our 2004 preliminary assessment." [see Exhibit 15]
March 11, 2004
In response to our FOIL request, Ms. Ray included a cover letter [Exhibit 16] and the four properties listed in Exhibit 17. The selling prices of the four properties (upon which Ms. Ray based our $65,500 preliminary assessment) were $40,000, $45,000, $47,500, and $59,000. The average price of these four properties is $47,875. Note that Ms. Ray’s assessment of our property is 11% higher than the highest single assessed value of the four properties represented in her sample (from which our assessment was determined) and 37% higher than the average assessment of the four sample properties.
March 16, 2004
Inasmuch as Ms. Ray obliquely referred to a "manual model" in her correspondence dated March 11, 2004, we sent her a FOIL correspondence [Exhibit 18 Page 1, Page 2] requesting a "complete presentation of the methodology and data incorporated by your manual model." Without such information, it would not be possible for us to ascertain how Ms. Ray’s results were achieved. In our FOIL request, we cited the following passage from the New York State Office of Real Property Services (NYS ORPS) website in order to underscore the appropriateness of our request:
"However, it is important to realize that the credibility of the ad valorem real property tax system depends on reports that clearly communicate the elements, results, opinions and value conclusions accurately and consistently.
"The ultimate users of the valuation results should be given: a description and justification of the model specification(s) considered, data requirements, and the models chosen for mass appraisal. Furthermore, valuation reports should include a description of the calibration methods considered and chosen including the mathematical form of the final models; identify appraisal performance tests used and set forth the performance measures attained; and explain any permitted departures employed."
March 23, 2004
In her written response, Ms. Ray informed us that she would not comply with our request, inasmuch as there are, in her view, proprietary issues surrounding the software which generates the results of the manual model [see Exhibit 19 Page 1, Page 2]. Of course, we never requested the manual model software; instead, we requested the information to which, according to the NYS ORPS, we were entitled, namely:
"… a description and justification of the model specification(s) considered, data requirements, and the models chosen for mass appraisal. Furthermore, valuation reports should include a description of the calibration methods considered and chosen including the mathematical form of the final models; identify appraisal performance tests used and set forth the performance measures attained; and explain any permitted departures employed."
Without a formal explanation of the precise manner in which Ms. Ray derived a preliminary assessment of $65,500 from the sales prices of the four properties she provided, her assignment of this $65,500 value can only be accepted on faith and cannot be substantively challenged. I need not belabor the implications for taxpayers in general.
May 2004
Appearing before the Cuyler BAR, we presented our analysis; but, we found ourselves thwarted once again by the Assessor’s repeated misrepresentations.
For example, my wife, Judy, attempted to establish the obvious fact that the Assessor’s preliminary assessment valuation of $65,500 was based on the four sample sales ($40,000, $45,000, $47,500, and $59,000) I earlier have identified.
Judy: "And did you not represent to us that you based our preliminary 2004 assessment on these four properties? Did you not represent that in your letter?"
Julie Ray: "No."
The issue can be resolved by referring to Exhibits 14 to 17 (above), where Ms. Ray’s correspondence reveals that the answers to Judy’s questions unambiguously should have been yes! Ms. Ray’s denials [documented by our transcript - see Footnote 6] undermined the substance of our case presented before the Cuyler BAR, a presentation which relied in major part on demonstrating the lack of supportability for Ms. Ray’s $65,500 assessment valuation based on the four sample properties that formed the basis of her valuation results.
Another notable outright misrepresentation involved Ms. Ray’s characterizations of land valuation. On her Town of Cuyler 2004 Land Valuation Schedule [Exhibit 20], this document as presented by Ms. Ray includes the following provision: "Residential properties of 10 acres or less cannot have wasteland; an influence code can be used to account for unique situations such as wetness, topography, environmental hazards etc." Now, contrast Exhibit 20 (2004 Cuyler Land Valuation Schedule) with the absence of such a provision incorporated into Exhibit 11, the Cuyler Land Valuation Schedule as of year 2002. Repeating a passage (dated September 2002) from the previous page of this website (PAST AS PROLOGUE): According to Mr. Joe Hesh (Albany Office of Real Property Tax Services), there are no state laws stipulating differential treatment for the valuation of land under 10 acres in area. The Town of Cuyler's Land Valuation Schedule for 2002 (Exhibit 11), among other things, identifies "waste" land and "wet" land as being valued at $100 per acre beyond the first acre on which a residence is situated. If Ms. Ray's "provision" included in her 2004 schedule is to be deemed credible, it must be the case that New York State added this provision to land valuation rules sometime between 2002 and 2004, right? Keep reading...
Consider the following exchange between Judy and Ms. Ray with respect to the subject of land valuation:
Judy: "Okay, so you have us at $17,500. Where are you putting the other acres, then? You’ve got us for the first acre at $10,500."
Julie Ray: "The other acres are always residual."
Judy: "Residual?"
Julie Ray: "Yes, residual. That’s standard for every residential property of 10 acres or less."
No, it isn’t! There is no such rule contained in the NYS ORPTS land valuation manuals posted on the NYS ORPTS website. Mr. Stanley Domanowski (Syracuse ORPTS; 315-471-2347) confirms that New York State has no such land valuation rule. In fact, Mr. Domanowski states that, if the description fits, then wasteland ought to be classified as wasteland. Also according to Mr. Domanowski, the Syracuse ORPTS has supervisory authority over the Cortland Office and, hence, Julie Ray. Keep in mind the time frame (May 2004) during which Mr. Domanowski's statement was made -- a time frame that matches the presentation of Ms. Ray's concocted provision. Thus, according to two separately contacted NYS ORPTS officials, Mr. Hesh and Mr. Domanowski, there wasn't such a rule stipulated in 2002 or 2004, and there certainly isn't now (see current NYS ORPTS Residential Farm and Vacant Land Property Record Card, Land Breakdown section). Note as well that, in direct contradiction to Ms. Ray's verbal representation made to Judy, there is no rule stipulating that it is "standard procedure" to classify as residual any acreage beyond the first acre on which the owner's home is situated for a residential property encompassing an area of 10 acres or less. That much having been said, Your Honor, I believe it is a straightforward matter to conclude that there is no need for further skewering of Ms. Ray's representations -- the defense rests!
It is also important to note that when our questions to Ms. Ray were considered by her to be too probing, she refused to address these questions. Instead, we were supposed to rely on her representations as gospel:
Judy: "Now, basically, as Julie explained to me in several conversations I had with her, the way she got to $65,500 was she only used those properties to get a base price for our house. She didn’t use those properties to get an assessment on our outbuildings. To get the assessment, Julie, on the outbuildings, you went out of area, correct?"
Julie Ray: "No. The same process was used -- okay, let’s stop, let’s stop."
Judy: "You didn’t use those properties" --
Julie Ray: "We’ve been through this before. The Board of Assessment Review Proceeding is confined to the 52 -- the 524. In other words, what is the value of the property and what determining factors do you have. We’re not required to go into process. Process would be an Article 78 proceeding."
The analysis I will be happy to provide upon request will prove, based on Ms. Ray’s own numbers, that the values she derived for our outbuildings were, in fact, generated precisely in the manner Judy has described above. Ms. Ray, therefore, not only has committed another misrepresentation, but in refusing to discuss the methodology used to obtain the outbuilding valuation (whether her refusal has a legal basis or not), she has demonstrated the absurdity of the grievance process. After all, if the Assessor does not have to explain the basis of her valuations and is always assumed to be correct, what is the point of conducting grievance proceedings in the first place?
The Cuyler BAR did lower Ms. Ray’s assessment from $65,500 to $61,505, but this figure represents a 6.4% net increase in our assessment (in relation to $57,800) and still makes no sense in relation to the four sales the Assessor claims were the basis of our valuation. Furthermore, the Cuyler BAR provided no explanation as to why our assessment was raised [see Exhibit 21 Page 1, Page 2] from $57,800 to $61,505.
June 3, 2004
Responding to our complaint identifying Ms. Ray’s refusal to share with us the precise data and methodology she used in her application of her "manual" model to derive our assessment, Mr. Robert Freeman (Executive Director, State of New York Department of State Committee on Open Government) seemingly sided with the Assessor, confirming that the Assessor does not have to share proprietary software with us. I say "seemingly" because, of course, we never requested the sharing of this software in the first place [see Exhibit 22 Page 1, Page 2].
July 22, 2004
With Mr. Thomas Perry acting as presiding Hearing Officer, Judy and I attended the SCAR hearing convened at the Cuyler Town Hall. Ms. Ray was accompanied by the Town of Cuyler’s Attorney, Mr. Donald Armstrong. Ms. Ray introduced three properties (not 10, as was incorrectly identified by Mr. Perry in his written report) by way of support for her arguments, two situated in DeRuyter and one in Harford, properties that she did not introduce before the Cuyler BAR at the May 2004 hearing. As has been earlier identified by Footnote 4, such an introduction is a violation of SCAR hearing procedures.
Mr. Perry was unaware that the Village of DeRuyter is situated in Madison as opposed to Cortland County, and the Assessor’s presentation of DeRuyter properties, by way of supplement to her original analysis, was accepted as valid by the Hearing Officer, despite our objection on grounds that the Village of DeRuyter is situated in Madison County as well as a number of additional significant economic relationships that render such property comparisons to Cuyler meaningless and therefore invalid (i.e., for the Town of Cuyler, per-capita income, as identified by year 2000 Census data, stands at $13,111; for the Village of DeRuyter, per-capita income stands at $20,658. The differential in per-capita income is 58%). Furthermore, Mr. Perry also apparently was unaware that the Town of Harford is located approximately 35 miles away from Cuyler, on the opposite side of Cortland County and is not, as Mr. Perry states in his decision, a town "surrounding the Town of Cuyler." According to CPLR Article 7 §731: "Hearing officers assigned shall be familiar with the assessing unit in which the real property subject to review is located …"
Additionally, we pointed out to Mr. Perry that we obtained our supplemental sales from the towns of Truxton, Taylor and Solon because those are precisely the towns (along with Cuyler) where the Assessor, if her statements before the Cuyler BAR are to be accepted (keeping in mind that these statements contradict a number of her FOIL representations), obtained her own original sales data that she used to calculate our 2004 assessment. Under these circumstances, it is proper to look again to those towns for supplemental sales data. It is not proper, however, to obtain additional sales data from a town 35 miles away or to "cherry-pick" residences outside Cortland County entirely. If this was not the case, an assessor could legitimately select townhouses situated in the upper-east side of Manhattan in order to provide support for her case. This point, it seems, was lost on or ignored by Mr. Perry.
In the "Data Presented" portion of his decision [Exhibit 23 Page 1, Page 2, Page 3, Page 4], Mr. Perry states:
"The homeowners cited 4 main sales, being the Randall, Bearup, Weir, and Hughes properties, situated in the towns of Cuyler and Truxton. They indicated that these were the sales utilized by the assessor, in part, to derive the assessed value for their home … In addition to these sales, they supplied 7 additional sales from the Towns of Cuyler, Truxton, Solon, and Taylor and indicated an average and median sales price for the individual towns and a combined figure for all the towns in total."
Elsewhere in his "Data Presented" section, Hearing Officer Perry indicates that we also supplied him with an appraisal. Yet in the “Analysis of the data presented” portion of his decision (the portion where the reasoning underlying his decision determination is presented), Mr. Perry concludes:
"The homeowners based their estimate of value on the current assessed value of the Weir property, which is $50,800. It is unreasonable to consider that the use of just one assessment, would support a reduction."
The previous two pronouncements by Mr. Perry bear repeating:
"The homeowners cited 4 main sales, being the Randall, Bearup, Weir, and Hughes properties, situated in the towns of Cuyler and Truxton. They indicated that these were the sales utilized by the assessor, in part, to derive the assessed value for their home … In addition to these sales, they supplied 7 additional sales from the Towns of Cuyler, Truxton, Solon, and Taylor and indicated an average and median sales price for the individual towns and a combined figure for all the towns in total."
"The homeowners based their estimate of value on the current assessed value of the Weir property, which is $50,800. It is unreasonable to consider that the use of just one assessment, would support a reduction."
These two pronouncements are entirely contradictory.
The "Data Presented" portion of the Hearing Officer’s decision represents his recounting of evidence presented. The "Analysis of the data presented" portion represents the Hearing Officer’s consideration of the evidence presented. In fact, we presented 17 different valuations (based solely on the Assessor's transactions data), our residential Appraisal, as well as the Assessor's current Cost Valuation Model (which identifies the value of our property as $47,700) by way of support for our assessment reduction. [The Assessor's transaction data are summarized in Exhibit 24 Page 1, Page 2, Page 3.] The $47,700 figure represented by the Assessor’s Cost Valuation Model can be viewed in Exhibit 25. The $53,000 figure represented by our Appraisal can be viewed in Exhibit 26 Page 2. It is clear that Mr. Perry overlooked, ignored, and/or dismissed outright these legitimate multiple and varied supporting data in arriving at his assessment determination. Yet the law states: "The Hearing Officer is directed by law to consider the best evidence in each case." [Source: How to File for a Review of Your Assessment, page 15.] Such outright dismissal (without explanation) of our evidence by the Hearing Officer is in direct violation of the law specifying consideration of "best evidence."
In the "Analysis of the data presented" portion of his decision, Mr. Perry states:
"The Hughes property did close more recently in 8/03 for $59,000. This home was on a smaller lot, with no out buildings." [emphasis added]
Mr. Perry’s recounting of evidence presented as it pertains to the Hughes property is incorrect. We provided him with copies of the property specifications of the Randall, Bearup, Weir, and Hughes properties. These were the four properties upon which the Assessor originally based our assessment. The property specification data to which reference is made were obtained from the Cortland County ORPTS computer database. The specification sheet for the Hughes property clearly indicates the presence of outbuildings [see "Improvements" section, Exhibit 27]. This is a matter of no small significance, inasmuch as the Hearing Officer seizes upon the lack of outbuildings on the Hughes property to justify substantially his ultimate decision not to lower our assessment.
In the "Analysis of the data presented" portion of his decision, Mr. Perry states:
"While the area average and median selling values that were provided, tended to reflect values in the mid to high $40’s, with no weighted comparison of the differences between these sales and the subject, the use of average and median sales values may or may not truly reflect the value potential of their home … I would have liked to see a weighted sales comparison."
By weighted sales comparison, the Hearing Officer is referring to the methodology of direct comparison embodied by an appraisal, an appraisal he acknowledges we presented to him. Citing the "Data Presented" portion of the Hearing Officer’s decision:
"Besides the appraisal report, there was no weighted comparison made between the Polakoff property and all of the sales data presented."
Such a statement is quite the contrivance (in today's environment, an increasingly common fall-back tactic used when you know you got nuthin', but you feel you gotta say somethin'!). The appraisal results represent a weighted comparison between our property and pertinent area sales data. The Assessor provided no such weighted comparison methodology for the properties she presented.
During the hearing, Mr. Perry confirmed the practical impossibility of entering each of the homes represented by the sales data we presented for the purpose of implementing the weighted comparisons to which he refers. Further underscoring this practical impossibility, RARs (Residential Assessment Ratios) have not been published for Cuyler since 1998 (until the time this hearing took place). Notwithstanding these pronouncements, we still were held to an impossible standard (a standard in no way addressed by the Assessor); and, such treatment irrefutably establishes Mr. Perry’s bias in favor of the Assessor.
This abrogation of the "even-handed consideration" principle (the underlying basis for SCAR proceedings and determinations) bears emphasis: In stating that he "would have liked to see a weighted sales comparison," Hearing Officer Perry is ignoring the fact that no such methodology was presented by the Assessor. At the same time, the Hearing Officer unconsciously (apparently) acknowledges that our presentation did include, in part, such a treatment (namely, the methodology of direct comparison incorporated by our appraisal). Why is this issue relevant? According to the publication entitled, "A Taxpayer’s Guide: How to File for A Review of Your Assessment," page 4, an appraisal is relevant to the determination of a property assessment. Yet the Hearing Officer summarily ignored our appraisal as support for our case while, at the same time, noting: (1) the importance of such a document as it pertains to the Hearing Officer’s ability to arrive at a reasonable determination of property value; and, (2) the Assessor’s failure to provide any treatment whatsoever as this treatment is embodied by an appraisal.
Thus, for this aspect of our SCAR presentation, the Hearing Officer has assigned greater weight to the Assessor’s treatment in relation to ours, despite the fact that a portion of our presentation satisfied the Hearing Officer’s methodological requirements and the Assessor’s treatment did not. We respectfully submit that such treatment neither can be mistaken for even-handed consideration (as mandated by law) nor consideration by the Hearing Officer of the "best evidence."
For the sake of argument (and playing the role of devil’s advocate), let’s assume the Hearing Officer implicitly may have dismissed the validity of our appraisal outright due to the fact that it was prepared in April 2001. Yet, even the Assessor accepts three-year-old data as valid for valuation purposes, and the Assessor herself uses three-year-old data in her valuation process. The Assessor’s sample of comparable properties (on which she based our assessment revaluation) includes a property (the Weir property) evidencing virtually the same date (9/7/2001) as our appraisal, and Hearing Officer Perry does not reject this datum as presented by the Assessor. In other words, the Assessor’s presentation of three-year-old data is accepted, our presentation of three-year-old data implicitly is not, and no justification whatsoever is provided for such differential treatment. It is difficult to fathom a treatment that could be considered more arbitrary and capricious in nature. Also of note is the fact that the Assessor did not challenge the validity of the appraisal, underscoring the fact that the Assessor’s challenge of the appraisal’s validity at the May 2002 Cuyler BAR hearing was inappropriate.
During the hearing, we attempted to present to the Hearing Officer an analysis that demonstrates precisely how the Assessor arrived at her valuation determination for our property. It is necessary to delve into such an analysis if the Assessor’s violations of generally accepted appraisal practices are to be systematically revealed. Moreover, this analysis was intended to constitute the major thrust of our rebuttal to the Assessor’s presentation. The Hearing Officer did not permit us to make this portion of our rebuttal presentation. Hearing Officer Perry stated that disaggregation of land and outbuildings from an overall transaction price constitutes an invalid procedure (for purposes of extrapolating an overall assessment valuation).
It is precisely this methodology, however, that was implemented by the Assessor, which explains in large part how the ludicrous assessment determination of $65,500 could possibly be achieved in relation to a sample property set with average and median prices of $47,875 and $46,250, respectively, and where the highest transaction price is $59,000. The ludicrousness of the Hearing Officer’s and Assessor’s ultimate assessment determinations is reinforced by the fact that our property is identified by the Assessor’s worksheets as ranking lower in grade than the four properties to which reference has been made. In this regard, the Assessor herself notes (in her 2004 "Model Application Computer Report") that our house needs a new roof [see Exhibit 25]. Other than this aspect (which should significantly lower our property valuation in relation to the property sample set used by the Assessor), our property contains no characteristics significantly different than those embodied by the four-property sample set.
While denying us the opportunity to rebut the basis of the method used by the Assessor to establish our assessment valuation, the Hearing Officer also states in the "Analysis of the data presented" portion of his decision:
"The data provided by the assessor, tended to support her value conclusion. Valuation models are commonly used in the assessment process."
The core basis of the Assessor’s valuation conclusion fundamentally relies upon the disaggregation procedure described above (applied to the Weir, Randall, Bearup, and Hughes properties), a procedure pronounced invalid by the Hearing Officer during the hearing but which, clearly, has been judged to be valid by the Hearing Officer in arriving at his subsequent decision. Moreover, at the end of the hearing and without explanation, Hearing Officer Perry refused to accept from us a written copy of either our valuation analysis or rebuttal argument. Without explanation, Mr. Perry also refused to accept our appraisal. Our rebuttal argument enumerates violations of generally accepted appraisal practices on the part of the Assessor. [See Footnote 7]
It is worth emphasizing that the Hearing Officer denied the validity of the Assessor’s valuation methodology. It was this rejection by the Hearing Officer which he used to justify to us his refusal to allow presentation of our rebuttal presentation. Yet at a later date, the Hearing Officer has rendered a decision that affirms the validity of the Assessor’s valuation methods. At best, such decision-making can only be characterized as cynical indifference to the administration of justice.
In the "Data Presented" portion of his decision, the Hearing Officer states that our "photos of the Bearup and Randall properties were not correct." Two of our photos (of the Assessor’s original four sample properties, which she selected) were correct. As a consequence of the conflicting address information we obtained, we agree that two of the photos we provided were incorrect. The Assessor presented no photos of these original four properties or of the supplemental properties she introduced. Yet the Hearing Officer accepted all properties introduced by the Assessor as valid to the purpose at hand. The following statement by the Hearing Officer indicates that all data introduced by us, other than the Weir property, were rejected:
"The homeowners based their estimate of value on the current assessed value of the Weir property, which is $50,800. It is unreasonable to consider that the use of just one assessment, would support a reduction."
Yet the four properties constituting the fundamental basis of the Assessor’s valuation (with no photographs provided) are the precise four properties we used to demonstrate the fundamental basis of our valuation treatment. We did present correct photographs of two of these four properties; the Assessor presented no photographs of any properties whatsoever. Yet this portion our data has been rejected on the grounds that we did not provide accompanying photographs; the Assessor’s identical (and supplementary) sales data are not rejected according to the standard applied to us by the Hearing Officer.
In his telephone call made to us early in July (for the purpose of arranging a hearing date), Hearing Officer Perry advised us to provide ample evidence to support the case being made, inasmuch as "the Assessor is always presumed to be correct," (quoting the Hearing Officer directly). We reminded the Hearing Officer that, once the actual hearing commences, "The Hearing Officer is directed by law to consider the best evidence in each case." [Source: A Taxpayer’s Guide: How to File for A Review of Your Assessment, page 15.]
Returning to the content of the correspondence sent to Ms. Marilyn Brown (Chairperson, Cortland County Legislature), it is instructive to remind the reader that her predecessor (Mr. Scott Steve) volunteered (based on our recounting of our story) that he suspected collusion between the Cuyler Town Assessor and the SCAR Hearing Officers who presided at our hearings. Such collusion (either at the implicit or explicit level) certainly would explain the outcomes we have described; but, whether these outcomes are based on collusion, bias, or naked indifference, the facts render it impossible for an objective observer to conclude that a fair consideration of our case took place.
Suggestion: Rather than use taxpayer resources to fund assessor, BAR, and SCAR proceedings, wouldn’t it be an improved use of these taxpayer dollars to dispense with such pretenses entirely? The state could simply send taxpayers a "Don Corleone" notice, indicating the amount of property taxes a higher authority has deemed they must pay. In addition to the cost savings gained, a greater degree of honesty would be achieved by the payment of tribute on this basis.
Lesson Learned: The prospects of achieving even-handed consideration (based on the presentation of factual relationships) at BAR and SCAR hearings are minimal; but, since the overwhelming majority of property owners never grieve their assessments (due to a variety of constraints), this is a state of affairs that "flies beneath the radar" of the general public. For those few who do choose to grieve, there are a variety of methods used to obfuscate the manner in which the system functions. For example, it is not uncommon for a local BAR to "split the difference" on an assessment increase. If the assessor raises a property value by $10,000, the BAR may reduce this increase to $5,000. The property owner walks away believing he or she has obtained a victory, but the assessment still has been raised $5,000. The assessor and town have achieved their goal of an increase in the property assessment and the property owner is placated. Seemingly, everyone wins.
If you’ve been carefully reviewing the chronology of our (admittedly pithy) treatment, we thought at this juncture it might be somewhat difficult to distinguish the forest from the trees, so to speak. Accordingly, we thought it might be a good idea to summarize a number of the major misrepresentations (let’s be frank, lies!) Ms. Ray presented to us in her official capacity as Town of Cuyler Assessor and to members of the BAR and SCAR hearings we’ve identified:
(1.) May 2002: Before the Cuyler BAR, Ms. Ray reversed the positions she had represented at the formal stipulation meeting conducted at our home. She justified her unwillingness to lower our assessment based on the introduction of a new tenet, namely, that Cortland County’s computer database does not represent an official data source. Since our analysis used these data and these data are unofficial, according to Ms. Ray’s statements before the Cuyler BAR, the results we obtained could not be considered valid and should be dismissed … one hour subsequent to making these pronouncements before Cuyler’s BAR members, Ms. Ray admitted to us in private that the assessment data in question are, in fact, official. She also admitted to us that she had made a mistake in not lowering our assessment, signing a stipulation agreement to this effect, and presenting this stipulation agreement to the BAR. When we asked her to inform the Cuyler BAR of her change of heart, she refused.
(2.) At the same 2002 Cuyler BAR hearing, one of the more blatant additional misrepresentations by Ms. Ray involved the basis of her contention that our appraisal was invalid. She asserted that one of the three properties used in the appraisal analysis was a duplex (as opposed to being a single-family residence), and this misspecification compromised the results of the entire appraisal. The property to which Ms. Ray refers is owned by Shawn Post; and, his name appears under mine in Exhibit 7 (an assessment list of Town of Cuyler Old Style, condition normal, pre-1900 properties). Old Style properties fall under the 210 property classification.
(3.) September 26, 2002: Ms. Ray asserted that, for residential property encompassing less than 10 acres, appraisal principles specify that no consideration is to be given to land that otherwise would be characterized as wasteland. In this regard and as identified by our appraisal, a significant portion of our land lies in a flood zone. Ms. Ray’s “10-acre rule” is a blatantly false representation of NYS ORPS land valuation guidelines. There is no such New York State rule! Moreover, it is important to note that Ms. Ray did not present this “10-acre rule” to the Cuyler BAR when arguing her case against us.
(4.) March 16, 2004: Inasmuch as Ms. Ray obliquely referred to a "manual model" in her correspondence dated March 11, 2004, we sent her a FOIL correspondence requesting a "complete presentation of the methodology and data incorporated by your manual model." Without such information, it would not be possible for us to confirm precisely how Ms. Ray’s results were achieved and whether the methods employed to obtain such results could be ascertained as being reasonably valid or suspiciously arbitrary. In her written response, Ms. Ray informed us that she would not comply with our request, inasmuch as there are, in her view, proprietary issues surrounding the software which generates the results of the manual model. Of course, we never requested the manual model software; instead, we requested the information to which, according to the New York State Office of Real Property Tax Services, we were entitled.
FOOTNOTES:
4. According to Mr. Russell Ruthig (Attorney at Law; Cortland, NY; 607-753-3551), it is a violation of SCAR procedures for an Assessor to present evidence at a SCAR hearing that was not previously introduced at that year’s BAR hearing.(Click here to return to text.)
6. As is our legal right in accordance with the Open Meetings Law, we tape recorded the Cuyler BAR hearing. (Click here to return to text.)
7. These violations include:
(1). By her own admission, the Assessor directly applies vacant land sales in Cuyler to the determination of our residential land valuation. As identified by the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance website (and consistent with generally accepted appraisal practices), vacant land value extrapolations properly are based on best potential use. On the other hand, land inseparably accompanying a residential property is to be valued on the basis of current use. In this regard, the following excerpt is particularly noteworthy:
“The valuation of property is determined by its state as of taxable status date, and may not be assessed on the basis of some future contemplated use … The one exception to ‘current use’ valuation is vacant land that has ‘...no current existing use beyond that of its potential sale for a future use, there is nothing improper in establishing its value by considering its market value as enhanced by potential uses."(17) In that case, the definition of value would be consistent with the definition of market value. Analysis of the highest and best use must be the basis for determining such land value.”
Source: Valuation Standards
Thus, the Assessor’s application of vacant land sales to our land valuation represents a violation of generally accepted appraisal practices.
(2.) The Assessor’s methodology includes a disaggregation of external-improvements (i.e., porches, garage, etc.) valuation from base valuation. The four sample properties selected by the Assessor are deemed to be appropriate to the task of establishing base valuation; but, in relation to these four sample properties, the Assessor relies on separate “out-of-neighborhood” data to establish valuation for the external-improvements portion of her valuation analysis. When, according to the Assessor, four sample properties (which the Assessor herself has selected) form an appropriate basis for establishing our base assessment valuation, it is methodologically inconsistent for the Assessor to assert that the corresponding four-property set of embedded external-improvements data represents a sample numerically insufficient to achieve the task at hand. Yet it is this very representation that the Assessor uses to justify obtaining additional external-improvements data from county-wide sources that do not reflect the “neighborhood” characteristics of the original four-property sample that she selected. By employing such data collection procedures, the Assessor ensures that the data obtained cannot possibly correspond anywhere near as closely to the characteristics of the original four-property data set as would external-improvements data extracted from the original four-property data set.
This approach unambiguously violates the “neighborhood” principle of valuation (and explains, together with the Assessor’s incorrect extrapolation of vacant land sales to the valuation of our residential land, her nonsensical $65,500 result as this result is to be contrasted against the transactions prices for the original four sample properties selected by the Assessor herself), and the institutional constraints introduced by mass appraisal methods do not legitimize such a violation.
The “neighborhood” principle is identified on the New York State Office of Real Property Tax Services website as being fundamental to the process of achieving supportable valuation outcomes:
“Research has shown that the most important property characteristics are property class, neighborhood, square foot of living area, grade, age and condition, design, lot size, and site amenities …” (Source: Level of Assessment Determination: An Owner's Manual for Maintaining Uniformity)
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